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This article focuses on unpacking the workings of the independent Indian nation-state in 
the region of Mewat in the aftermath of Partition violence, particularly the state’s 
rendering of the Meo community there as a minority. This violence has been called a 
‘rite of political and territorial passage’ and ‘systemic ethnic cleansing’ by scholars Shail 
Mayaram and Ian Copland, respectively. Building upon their works, this article focuses 
on state actors and details their ‘rule of difference’ in the treatment of Meos through the 
years 1947 to 1949 i.e. from their displacement to the conditions of their resettlement. 
This documentation is done by accessing the hitherto unused files of the Ministry of 
States, the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
Prime Minister’s Secretariat at the National Archives, and the post-1947 papers of 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Pandit Sunder Lal held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library.  
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Introduction 
 
Historians have extensively documented the vortex of violence that gripped the British Indian 
provinces and Indian princely states in the build-up to and the aftermath of the Partition of 
India in 1947.0F1 This historiographical corpus can be divided into two hitherto distinct but 
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increasingly overlapping categories of (a) partition literature recalling riots, refugees, relief 
and rehabilitation,1F2 and (b) the scholarship on the post-partition consolidation of successor 
dominion states centred around constitution, planning, republic and states reorganisation.2F3 
This article, situated within this developing overlap,3F4 unpacks the workings of the 
independent Indian nation-state in the region of Mewat, particularly the manner in which the 
Meo community was marginalised in the aftermath of Partition violence there. This violence 
has been rightly called a ‘rite of political and territorial passage’ and ‘systemic ethnic 
cleansing’ by Shail Mayaram and Ian Copland respectively.4F5 It has been well-explored by 
Mayaram in terms of its ‘objectification of the other and transformation of the self’.5F6 It has 
been held up as an example of ‘the further shores of Partition’ by Copland.6F7 Complementing 
their works, this article focuses on the treatment meted out by the emerging Indian nation-
state to the Meos through 1947-49 and attempts to catalogue their consequent minoritisation. 
This was achieved by a re-definition of the categories of nation and citizen, a re-configuration 
of the discourse of loyalty, a renewed commitment to communalised discrimination, and a 
reassertion of the metropolitan prejudices of the bureaucratic elite.  
The emergence of a composite culture in the region of Mewat through medieval ages 
and its accompanying politicisation in modern times are well-established. While Mayaram 
showed the shaping of the Meos’ ‘Muslim Identity’,7F8 Saurabh Bhardwaj has traced their 
‘Migration, Mobility and Memories’.8F9 Recently, Mukesh Kumar has brought out more 
contemporary aspects of the complex ‘nature of Religious Identities’, embodied by the 
Meos.9F10 Earlier, Majid Siddiqi had researched the multiple, ‘interlocking’ context of their 
popular, peasant rebellion against their princely rulers in 1932-33.10F11 This article extends their 
research by focusing on the newly independent Indian nation-state being ranged against this 
old community, with its history of anti-state resistance and marginality.11F12 It adds further 
details to the former’s difficulties in coming to terms with this composite space in the wake 
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of Partition; a time of transition, still ‘constituting some kind of an academic no-man’s 
land’.12F13 It seeks to plumb the depths of its ‘official mind’ during a period of flux when the 
imperatives of state-consolidation, the ideologies of nation-building and the contingencies of 
Partition saw it further worsen the fractured social milieu of the Meos. Even as bloodshed 
subsided in the last days of the 1940s, a form of routine, state or bureaucratic, violence,13F14 
emerged, causing a million pities of Partition,14F15 as state actors sought to unfeelingly impose 
their policies. 
The article investigates the heartfelt charge that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad laid at Dr 
N.B. Khare, prime minister of Alwar and associated with both the Indian National Congress 
and the Hindu Mahasabha, ‘aapne sitam kiya Alwar mein. Aapne Musalmaanon ko bahar 
nikaal diya [you committed an outrage in Alwar, you threw out the Muslims]’.15F16 Covering 
the period from May 1947 to May 1949, it is organised in five parts, preceded by a short 
prologue and followed by a short coda and conclusion. Each part seeks to provide the ‘pure 
particular’ around a thematic phase of the Meos’ unsettled existence, scattered experience 
and wider displacement, and, their stock-taking by the state, for its provision of a ‘Compact 
Area’ for them.16F17 This accumulation is based on the documents available at the National 
Archives of India (NAI), from the Ministry of States (MoS), which was the nodal ministry for 
the treatment of Meos; the Ministry of Relief & Rehabilitation (R&R); the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA) and the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (PMS). These are supplemented by the 
Pandit Sunder Lal Papers and the post-1947 Jawaharlal Nehru Papers housed at the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library (NMML). Pandit Sunder Lal,17F18 along with fellow Gandhian 
social workers Acharya Vinoba Bhave and Mridula Sarabhai,18F19 was actively involved in the 
Phir Basao [re-settle] scheme for Meos. 
These documents allow us access to the period from before mid-August 1947, when 
Meos were looked upon as agitators and rebels ‘against the state’ in Alwar,19F20 to after mid-
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May 1949, when the United State of Rajasthan was created and their return to their homeland 
was not considered ‘practical politics’ by many of those in power in New Delhi.20F21 As noted 
by Gyanendra Pandey, this was because by then the Meos of Mewat, along with ‘the Momins 
of U.P. and Bihar [and] the Mapillas of Malabar’ had been reduced to ‘simply 
“Muslims”…fundamentally different and forever suspect’.21F22 This article attempts to throw 
light on this deteriorating relationship between the Meo community and the post-1947 Indian 
nation-state in five parts, each of which draw from different primary prisms of material. It 
threads together (a) eye-witness accounts of non-state actors (non-Meos as well as Meos), (b) 
reports of the Gandhian interlocutors who visited the affected areas, (c) statements of local 
police and revenue officials, (d) the higher bureaucracy’s response to the situation on the 
ground and (e) the pronouncements of political leaders in highest positions, including the 
Prime Minister and his Deputy. In doing so, it adds to a picture of rupture of the Meos’ social 
contract with a Hinduised state and society; what Mayaram termed the ‘tense psychological 
moment of belonging/unbelonging to the Indian nation for Indian Muslims’.22F23 
 
Prologue 
 
Historically, the ‘peasantisation and Islamisation’ of the Meos in medieval ages was a long 
process of ‘contestations and accommodations’23F24 on one hand and ‘continuous resistance to 
various state formations’ on the other.24F25 According to Mayaram, their self-perception centred 
on being ksatriya and one of their origin myths surrounded an early-eleventh century Sardar 
named Abdul Rahim Khan. Thereafter, they settled in the area around Gurgaon, Alwar and 
Bharatpur, which saw the emergence of a complex community that saw more communal 
unease as the colonial period started to draw to a close, with a growth of ‘popular 
organisations’ in these princely states and a growing crisis of governance, detailed by 
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Copland.25F26 Moreover, as Pandey has remarked, in 1947, the ‘regional, caste and occupational 
markers’ by which Muslims had been formerly distinguished lost their significance. The 
composite identity of the Meos was also cut through in the determining aftermath of Partition 
and ‘all of them were [seen] as open or closet Pakistanis’.26F27 Evangeline Ingram, a Quaker 
social worker in Gurgaon for sixteen years and a member of the Friends Service Unit there, 
recalled that in early-March 1947, in a panchayat of Jats and other Hindus of Gurgaon, Alwar 
and Bharatpur held at village Hodal, it was decided that Meos, by virtue of their being 
Muslims, should be looted. In the then-polarised pre-partition context, it represented a 
culmination of the attempts by the kingdoms of Alwar and Bharatpur to craft a Hindu rastra, 
assisted by the social agenda of the Arya Samaj, from the 1920s and 1930s onwards and 
resisted by the Meos led by Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf.27F28  
Post-15 August 1947, the rulers of Bharatpur and Alwar, as well as their families, 
courtiers and civil and police officials, began ‘doing away with all the Meos, insisting that 
they were rebelling’. They were supported by the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Patiala, who 
‘sent forces to remove, shoot and kill them’.28F29 A number of Meos fled to Pakistan, while 
another large group went to Gurgaon, where they were harassed, looted and driven out by the 
police and military of the Indian Union. Some members of the local Congress party tried to 
help, and the Lady Mountbatten Fund provided them with a donation of Rs. 8810/- for three 
months. One such member was Pandit Harihar Lal Bhargava, advocate and member of the 
Phir Basao committee in Mewat, who lamented the fact that  
 
in spite of the commitments of the [all-India Congress Committee] and of 
the Indian Union, orders are being passed in such a way that people instead 
of rehabilitating (sic) are being forced to vacate their lands. In Gurgaon 
district, where Muslims in lakhs are residing, orders have been passed by 
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the DC [District Commissioner] that Meos, resettled in their vacated homes 
be ejected with aid of police. Similar orders have been passed in Alwar 
state…I fail to understand that now when the Indian Union wants all 
Muslims to return to their homes, action is taken in this manner. Every 
Muslim has a right to enter his home and have preferential rights than 
Western Punjab Hindu and Sikh refugees…Alwar and Bharatpur Meos are 
out of their homes for the last ten months and have no means of substance; 
when some thefts take place, the whole Meo community is blamed.29F30 
 
Wazir and Rustam Khan, Abdullah and Allah Baksh, Ismail and Imam Khan, and 
Sulaiman and Bashir Ahmed were a handful of Meos, whose names and grievances made it to 
the officials’ registers in spring 1948 and thus to the archives seventy years on. Their women, 
cattle, ornaments/jewels and crops had been attacked and captured, harassed and looted, by 
the States’ military, with the Indian Union’s police being either spectators or accomplices; 
even on occasion persecutors, but scarcely protectors.30F31 The Meos’ pleas for help prompted 
social workers like Pandit Jiwan Lal, Pandit Bhargava and Munshi Ram Malik to tour the 
area in April 1948, along with Chaudhary Yasin Khan (President, All-India Meo Panchayat), 
and they reported to Sunder Lal and Vinoba Bhave. Their reports record the plight of the 
Meos at the hands of both officials and non-officials: the Bharatpur state military forcibly 
removing them and charging ransom money and the Gurgaon police registering false cases 
against them, alleging connections with the Communist Party of India. At the heart of it all 
was the following question: can/should Muslims such as Meos, who were forced to leave 
their homes in spite of their desire to stay in India, be treated as refugees or displaced persons 
and be given the same facilities as Pakistani non-Muslim refugees? 31F32 Or, as the village 
revenue officials and local sub-inspectors were telling them in village after village in Alwar, 
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Bharatpur and Gurgaon, having reduced their plural identity to that of a singular, 
homogenised ‘ethnic other’,32F33 that they had ‘no right to live in the state’ and ‘should go to 
Pakistan’. After all, ‘there was no Muslim officer from DC [District Collector] to patwari. 
Why were they staying here?’33F34 
 
May 1947-March 1948: Performing Prejudice 
 
In his travels of about 220 miles in the area, Munshi Malik found only ‘a few Jat villages 
displeased with Meos’ rehabilitation’ on Indian soil, but many more ‘men in service [so 
displeased], because of personal bias’. Moreover, he saw ‘Meos and their neighbouring 
Hindus happy in their homeland’, but ‘the Pakistani refugees in villages not satisfied’. Malik 
asserted that ‘if the government considers the Meos as loyal citizens of the Indian Union, then 
it should see that each one of them is put in possession of his original home and land’. For 
Pakistan refugees, he recommended that ‘they be rehabilitated in new lands, still vacant’.34F35 
This was in direct opposition to the demand by ‘substantial sections of the north Indian 
population, especially Hindu and Sikh refugees and those most directly affected by their 
influx, that north India or at least parts of it…should be cleared of Muslims: the latter should 
be sent to Pakistan, and the territory handed over to the Sikhs and Hindus’.35F36 Indeed, Rotem 
Geva has recently investigated ‘Muslim minoritization’ in Delhi and their ‘ghettoization, 
resulting from ongoing struggles over Muslim houses’,36F37 for the rehabilitation of Hindu and 
Sikh refugees there. Before her, Vazira Zamindar had shown the effects of the processes of 
Partition, put in place to make citizens of subjects in the national capital.37F38 The 
correspondence of Chaudhary Yasin Khan, arguably the most important leader of the Meos at 
this time, shows what they were enduring at the hands of state actors. Khan was a member of 
the Punjab Legislative Council and Assembly between 1927 and 1947. He had mobilised a 
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major peasant movement comprising Meos, Jats and other caste groups in Alwar and 
Bharatpur in 1932.38F39 He was arrested on 27 April 1948 in Daryaganj, Delhi on suspicion of 
being a Communist, and was put under preventive detention. No charges were framed against 
him and no further claims were made. Yet, he remained in jail for a month. This is how he 
pleaded for his release in a representation to the District Magistrate:  
 
I am not a Communist. I have never had any connection with the CP. I, 
along with many other leading social workers, have been helping the Meos 
in their rehabilitation since September 1947. The Meos of Gurgaon district 
along with those from Alwar and Bharatpur states staying in Gurgaon, are 
and will always be loyal to the Indian Union. They have no connection 
with Pakistan…The stay of Meos in Gurgaon is due to Mahatmaji’s advice 
and the keen interest which he took in their case. My detention in jail is of 
no good to the government or the public. I assure you once again that I will 
continue to exert my influence with the Meos and see that they prove their 
loyalty to their Home Government by their deeds and that they will be 
friendly with their neighbours. Will you kindly order my release today and 
oblige? 39F40 
 
Khan worked under the guidance of Vinoba Bhave and was not the only Meo leader to be 
‘wrongly arrested’. Driven out of Alwar and Bharatpur states in end-May 1947, about three 
lakh Meos came to the adjoining Gurgaon district of the province of Punjab. From October 
1947, pressure mounted on them to leave for Pakistan and Gandhi sent his lieutenants Sunder 
Lal and Maulana Hafizur Rahman, to assess the situation. Seeing his active interest, in early 
November 1947, the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution recommending that 
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evacuees return to their original homes, and the Union Government proclaimed this policy.40F41 
When Fateh Jung ka Gumbad was desecrated in Alwar, Nehru wrote to the Deputy Prime 
Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, who was also the Minister for Home and States ministries that 
the princely ruler be ‘pulled up’ for this ‘disgraceful sacrilege’ else ‘that will reflect on the 
GOI [Government of India] also’.41F42 R. C. Hadow, of the British High Commission in Delhi, 
was visiting Alwar on 17 November, when he reported seeing a convoy of 80,000 Meos ‘on 
their way to Pakistan’. The next day, he saw some 10,000 of them returning, having ‘decided 
against going to Pakistan after all’.42F43 Subsequently, Mridula Sarabhai visited Gurgaon on 2-4 
December and, eventually, Gandhi himself arrived and addressed a Meo gathering in Ghasera 
village, 45 kilometres south-west of Gurgaon, on 19 December. Calling them the ‘backbone 
of India’, he urged the Meos to stay back in a speech, echoes of which are still heard seventy 
years on.43F44  
Gandhi’s assassination in January 1948 is commonly held as ‘the turning point in 
“communal” relations after Partition’.44F45 Yasmin Khan regards the situation after Gandhi’s 
death as one of ‘a major consolidation of power…through the selective use of the state 
apparatus, the strengthening of Nehru’s authority’, and ‘the funeral and mourning rituals 
themselves as political events, widely shared and experienced by recently-emancipated 
postcolonial Indians’.45F46 However, prejudices among state officials and Congress politicians 
against Meos, equated with Muslims, held through the summer of 1948 and beyond, resulting 
in their widespread dislocation. Harihar Lal Bhargava, who shuttled back-and-forth between 
Gandhi, the Central Government and Gurgaon Meos from December 1947, carried stories of 
‘acts of terrorism’ along the Alwar-Bharatpur-Gurgaon border. On 22 March 1948, Sobha 
Ram, then-Chief Minister of the newly formed Matsya Union, composed of the princely 
states of Alwar, Dholpur, Bharatpur and Karauli, visited the Meos in Gurgaon, assuring them 
of their imminent return to Alwar.46F47 Dr N. B. Khare’s premiership had ended in February 
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1948 and his departure had been accompanied by sanctions against the Rajas of Alwar and 
Bharatpur, who had been ‘complicit’ in Gandhi’s assassination.47F48 Sobha Ram’s assurance, 
however, was to be effected by the mandarins in the MoS and R&R, who informed Harihar 
Lal that ‘refugees from West Punjab were to be rehabilitated first and nothing can yet be said 
about Meos’. On the ground, compulsion and conversion continued through the summer of 
1948, unless Meos obtained ‘permits from the States Ministry’.48F49  
By May 1948, more than a year after their troubles had started, Meos could be divided 
into five categories: (1) those who never left their homes, regardless of the dangers, (2) those 
who were driven to Pakistan and desired return, (3) those who left but returned soon after, (4) 
those who left for other parts of India, (5) those who were driven to Pakistan but returned 
after a while, (5). It was the last three categories that bore the brunt of the discrimination by 
local panchayat, police and civil authorities, while those who never left their homes had to 
face the pressure of conversion. In the hands of the new state, as under the old princely order, 
Meos were charged simultaneously with being communalist, separatist, communists and cow-
eaters, as the local officialdom and regional administration remained the same.49F50 On the other 
hand were petitions from Jats, Ahirs, Gujars, Mahajans and Thakurs of Kirdari and 
surrounding villages, which begged to ‘certify’ the ‘excellent character and conduct’ of their 
Meo neighbours and ‘strongly recommend’ their wish to return. Evangeline Ingram compiled 
a report for the Friends Service Unit (Gurgaon) on the ‘situation in Mewat’ at this time, 
which records these paradoxes and perversions well:  
 
The local District Commissioner and Superintendent of Police are persons 
responsible for turning out Meos forcibly and they belonged to the West 
Punjab. Their attitude and mentality [are] unchanged. The local police 
organised two panchayats and wanted the Meos to agree by compulsion to 
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stop cow-killing. The local officials are infuriated against local leaders and 
have arrested [them] under the pretext of being Communists…The Meos are 
returning from Pakistan and are not allowed to settle in their vacant houses. 
The district Congress president, Rao Gajraj Singh, was a Hindu Mahasabha-
ite and a recruiting officer in 1942 and opposed all Congress activities. He 
still holds that attitude of mind…Under the pretext of the East Punjab 
Evacuee Property Act, those Meos who resettled six months back on their 
lands and houses on the assurance of the government are forcibly ejected. 
Some Meos who resettled in Alwar on the assurance of the new Ministers 
are being forcibly ejected…Looting and murdering are the order of the day 
at the instigation of the Bharatpur military. In spite of declarations by the 
government, 6 months [later] not even a chaprasi out of Mohammedans has 
been employed. No loans or relief is provided to this population…In 
general, the attitude of the local officials in Gurgaon or these states are 
antagonistic towards this Muslim population…Meos love their motherland 
and are staying in spite of all provocation and persecution. Yasin Khan is 
the sole leader of the Meos and his people have great faith in him. He has 
advised [them] to join the Congress...He is the person who practised the 
sermons of Bapuji that the Meos should prefer death rather than go to 
Pakistan.50F51 
 
With the sustained activism of social workers putting pressure on New Delhi, the 
administrations of Alwar and Bharatpur were forced to respond. K.B.L. Seth and S.N. Sapru, 
senior ICS Men sent as ‘administrators’ to these princely states, set out their positions in 
February-March 1948. Seth began by offering some numbers from the 1941 census, which 
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had recorded 1.34 lakh Meos in Alwar state – a figure that might have increased to 1.40 lakh 
by August 1947. Out of these, barring the 30,000-50,000 who were converted and were thus 
able to stay back, the rest had left the state, but a small number of 10,000 had subsequently 
returned. Among the rest on the move, it was difficult to estimate how many had gone to 
Pakistan and how many remained in Gurgaon. Seth called for a three-fold conditional 
cooperation with New Delhi’s policy to restore these latter to their homes/lands and, in doing 
so, provided the first glimpse of the workings of the ‘official mind’.  
Cultivable land belonging to about 18,000 Meos had already been distributed among 
about 9,000 refugees from Punjab, the NWFP and Sindh, with permanent hereditary rights. 
The Alwar government now felt it ‘unfair and hard to deprive the refugees of the land’, 
although it had been unfair on its part to allot these lands to the refugees in the first place. 
Second, it wanted to make a clear distinction between Meos who had migrated to Pakistan 
and those who remained in India. It had no objection ‘to restore to the latter, as far as 
possible, the lands which they [had] held prior’ to the disturbances. This did not however 
apply ‘to those whose lands [had] been given to the refugees’. They were to get equivalent 
land elsewhere. As for the former group, Seth considered it ‘extremely risky’ to restore land 
to them. This was so not only because of the then-prevailing communal climate across north 
India, but also because of ‘the attitude of the Meos’ towards the refugees. Claiming that 
Alwar was near the Pakistan-India border – it is at least 450 kilometres away – Seth could not 
ignore the ‘potential danger’ of the existence of hostile Meos – returnees from Pakistan – in 
case of a conflict. Finally, Seth hoped that New Delhi would extend the necessary financial 
assistance for the resettlement of Meos, even though the problem was one of Alwar’s own 
making.51F52  
On the same day, Seth also wrote to the ministry of R&R, making it clear that Meos’ 
resettlement made it impossible for Alwar state to take in any more refugees. He asserted that 
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the previous commitments had been made on the assumption that the Meo evacuees ‘would 
not be coming back’. In a transparent pressure tactic, Seth remarked that only if New Delhi 
agreed that the Meos who were returning from Pakistan ‘should not be given back their 
lands’, would it be ‘possible to absorb some more refugees’.52F53 This worried V. D. Dantyagi, 
Joint Secretary in the ministry, and he urged the MoS to prod Seth to take at least 40,000 
refugees from the Kurukshetra camp. This was in view of the fact that over 1 lakh Meos had 
left Alwar, and perhaps 50,000 in Gurgaon, and based on the assumption that they would 
‘like to return’.53F54 One wonders how Seth would have responded to Syed Nasir Hussain Zaidi, 
a native landowner of Alwar state, who had been forced by the communal disturbances – in 
which many of his relatives were killed and all his belongings were seized – to flee to 
Karachi. Many Muslim landowners of Alwar state had fled in similar circumstances and were 
‘intensely willing to go back provided there [was] no further danger’. Writing to Nehru, Zaidi 
begged him to save them ‘from being totally undone’.54F55  
From the neighbouring Bharatpur, Sapru followed suit. Claiming that about 60,000 
Meos had left Bharatpur as a result of 1947’s disturbances, Sapru speculated that ‘the 
majority of them [had] gone over to Pakistan’. As in Alwar, the land and houses of Meos had 
already been occupied by refugees from West Punjab but also ‘other persons, who came in 
search of land from Jodhpur and Jaipur states and Rohtak and Delhi’. In this way, about 
18,000 people had been settled and to Sapru, bringing the uprooted Meos back meant shifting 
this group, with consequent ‘severe resentment’. Sapru went further than Seth, when terming 
the Meos a danger to state security, by pronouncing that they had ‘not been known to be a 
peace-loving and law-abiding people’. Concluding that ‘there was considerable feeling in the 
state against the Meos because of the past’, Sapru advised the MoS ‘to keep the Meos away 
for the present’, notwithstanding New Delhi’s declarations to the contrary.55F56  
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While Seth and Sapru were thus stalling, Meo leaders from Alwar and Bharatpur, 
Subedar Abdul Shakoor and Chaudhary Shamen Singh, were joining hands with Bhargava 
and Khan in taking their entreaties to Nehru. Barred from their homelands for nine months, 
driven out by the states’ civil, police and military officials, and desirous of return under the 
declared policy of Nehru’s government, they sought life and land, including for those 
compelled to leave for Pakistan but who ‘wish to return and be loyal citizen[s]’. Pointing out 
that along with Punjabi refugees, ‘Jats from Rohtak, Hissar and Gurgaon districts were given 
lands left by Meos’, they demanded that the 3 lakh Muslims (Meos and others) staying in 
Gurgaon ‘should not be sent to Pakistan but be set at liberty’ to return to their homes.56F57 They 
were mistaken in approaching him though, for the man who mattered in these affairs was 
Patel. It was he to whom Sapru’s and Seth’s communications were brought and, in his reply 
to them, he was ‘strongly of the view that for the time being only non-Muslim refugees 
should be settled in Bharatpur and Alwar’ and ‘Meos in camps in Gurgaon, whether of 
Gurgaon or of these states, should be settled on vacant lands in Gurgaon’. Patel did not see 
‘any prospect in the near future of Meos from Pakistan coming back’. In any case, nothing 
was to adversely affect ‘the flow of non-Muslim refugees from Kurukshetra to Alwar and 
Bharatpur’.57F58 
 
March-June 1948: Neither Citizen nor Refugee 
 
Patel had been put on the spot on the Meo question in the legislative assembly in mid-March, 
specifically on the issue of the increasing number of skirmishes between Meos residing in 
Gurgaon district and villagers on the adjoining Bharatpur territory.58F59 Enquiries from Seth and 
Sapru had thrown light on the peculiar bind that Meos and refugees found themselves in. The 
heart of the matter was the Rabi crop, which the Meos had sown before they had to leave 
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Bharatpur. Now, these crops, claimed by them, were being cut/reaped by refugees. Senior 
police officials were requesting their civil service superiors to decide ‘whether this crop 
[belonged] to the Meos, the State or the Refugees’. Instead, Seth was occupied with 
examining proposals for establishing Home Guards in the Matsya Union and creating special 
armed police for border villages. Lamenting that both the strength and the discipline of the 
police force in Alwar and Bharatpur was unsatisfactory to patrol the twenty–twenty-five 
miles long border with Gurgaon, Seth sought to shift the responsibility to the shoulders of the 
District Magistrate (DM) and the Superintendent of Police (SP), Gurgaon, ‘whatever the 
respective rights of the contesting parties’.59F60  
Bharatpur’s Inspector-General of Police (IGP) as well as the SP, however, were clear 
that ‘the question of the ownership of the crop [had] to be decided first’, before attempting 
such solutions as calling military troopers.60F61 All in all, 92 such cases of raid, theft, arson, loot 
and killing were registered between August 1947 and March 1948 against Meos, almost all 
belonging to Bharatpur and now forced to reside in villages on the border in Gurgaon district. 
Officials, with the exception of Gopal Das, approached the situation in isolation, as a law and 
order problem created by the ‘Meo menace’.61F62 Continuing with the colonial ‘construction of 
Meo criminality’,62F63 as described by Mayaram, they did not consider the immediately 
preceding context of the Meos’ enforced deprivation followed by their enforced proximity to 
their land, labour and its riches. Alongside, there was another side-show to this unfolding 
story, which throws more light on the harsh circumstances and hard sentiments, prevailing 
around Meos. 
Over 8-10 April 1948, Muslim Rajputs from village Bhungara Thapar and Muslim 
Ranghars from village Mungara Thatar of Alwar state had seen about 100 individuals being 
evacuated in a military truck bearing a Pakistani plate and this had caused a ‘sensation’ in the 
area.63F64 Sher Ali, a resident of Bhungara, had a son-in-law in the Pakistani army, Jamadar 
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Wali Mohammad, who was organising this escape for his relatives and others. Quite apart 
from procedural issues, the more disturbing thing was that it was claimed that these residents 
of Bhungara Thapar had ‘voluntarily’ changed their religion during the disturbances. About 
half of the Muslim population in this area had left earlier and those remaining had sought to 
‘embrace Hinduism’. Clearly, given their willingness to go to Pakistan, their conversion had 
been anything but ‘voluntarily’. Yet, the local Nazim, the Station House Officer, the SP and 
the DM insisted on it, to imply illegality ‘on the part of Pakistan personnel’. They claimed 
that this enraged Hindu residents, thus ultimately ‘jeopardising’ the lives of the remaining 
Muslims.64F65 This manner of ‘blame displacement’ was often used to anticipate the breach of 
‘public peace’.65F66 The Ministry of R&R stated that if these converted persons wished ‘to go 
over to Pakistan’, they would not object,66F67 as the two Prime Ministers had recently decided in 
regard to such forced conversions. The MoS, on the other hand, was bullish: 
 
The policy in question was to be applied to the recovery of converted 
persons in the East Punjab states…The point at issue is the illegal and 
unauthorised use of a military truck by certain Pakistan personnel for the 
evacuation of their converted relatives…If this sort of thing were to be 
condoned, there is every danger of a communal frenzy.67F68 
 
In other words, for the MoS, if some Meos they had relinquished their Muslim 
identity in exchange for the right to life, they must live out that life in India as Hindus. Those 
who had resisted this deal of either safaya [cleansing] or suddhi [conversion] and were 
therefore on the run from Alwar and Bharatpur, must leave for Pakistan. Non-Muslims, on 
the other hand, especially if they were refugees from Pakistan, had the Indian nation and the 
state to themselves. As Patel put it to a Hindu correspondent from West Punjab, ‘you can rest 
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assured that the Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan cannot be considered as aliens in India’.68F69 Only 
if there was ‘room left’ after their rehabilitation, could the resettlement of Meos be 
considered. That too, if, till then, they stayed put in Gurgaon.69F70 Describing their state as 
another episode in ‘twentieth-century history of nation-state formation, competing 
nationalisms and competing proselytism’, Shail Mayaram has argued that ‘few Meos were 
interested in Pakistan, in Urdu or in the Muslim League, but their choices were few; to die, 
convert or cross the border’.70F71  
On the other hand, as Mridula Sarabhai was informed, non-Muslim refugees arriving 
from Pakistan were to be settled in Bharatpur and Alwar, while Meos returning from Pakistan 
were to be settled in Gurgaon; close to but not on their former homelands.71F72 After all, they 
were evacuee Muslims requiring restoration and not non-Muslim refugees requiring 
rehabilitation, and the ‘restoration of evacuee property [was] subject to rehabilitation 
requirements’. Despite the fact that the agricultural property had been evacuated under 
duress, Lall and others did not think it possible to permit its ‘restoration’ to Meos.72F73 And yet, 
all-powerful as the MoS seemed, there were voices in the upper echelons of the state 
apparatus to at least contest it. C. M. Trivedi, Governor of East Punjab, emerged as one such 
voice. He proposed to K. C. Neogy, Minister for R&R, as well as the Prime Minister that of 
the two and a half lakh Meos, who stayed behind, 80,000 belonged to Alwar and Bharatpur 
and their resettlement was therefore the responsibility of the Matsya Union. Trivedi was 
responding to the MoS’s position that these Meos should be settled in Gurgaon, while an 
equivalent amount of land should be reserved in Alwar and Bharatpur for Hindu and Sikh 
refugees. Further, he was informed that the Matsya Union wished ‘to allot the lands 
abandoned by the Meos to local residents’, and not to refugees.73F74 Sobha Ram wanted to 
reserve 50,000 acres out of the 2,00,000 acres left behind by Meos ‘for redressing internal 
inequalities of tenures and holdings’. The remainder, if not taken up by non-Muslim refugees, 
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was to be sold or let to people from inside or outside Matsya Union. Trivedi suggested that 
this ‘evacuee’ land should be used for resettlement of all Meos in India.74F75  
Patel swatted this suggestion aside, when he met a deputation from the Matsya Union 
ministry a week later. He told them that he was ‘entirely opposed’ to the return of Muslims to 
Alwar and Bharatpur and instructed them that if any representations like Trivedi’s, were 
made to the Matsya Union, they should say that ‘it was for the States Ministry’ to decide. The 
Matsya Union’s position was that ‘in place of Muslims’, it would accept refugees.75F76 Faced 
with such intransigence, Nehru finally entered the fray directly and read the following riot act 
to the mandarins in the MoS: 
 
It is the decided policy of the GOI that Muslims who had left their houses 
temporarily owing to disturbed conditions, for other parts of India, are 
entitled to have their property restored to them provided the Custodian 
considers it justified. The position taken by [Matsya Union] that the entire 
agricultural property evacuated by the Meos was required for the 
rehabilitation of refugees from Western Pakistan, and therefore it was not 
possible to remit its restoration to them, would not be defensible. We may 
not be able to restore the entire property to the Meos in Bharatpur and 
Alwar, because during their absence some other interests might have been 
created in part of the property and we might find it difficult to evict the 
parties that have acquired such interests, but after excluding such property 
and also excluding some other that might have already been promised to 
refugees, it should be possible to return the rest of the land provided the 
local inhabitants do not object.76F77 
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It was clear that Nehru and Patel were on a collision course on the question of ‘the early 
disposal of the Meos squatting in Gurgaon’. The MoS coolly informed the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat that ‘the policy of the States Ministry has been accepted by the Ministry of 
R&R’.77F78 Nehru’s allies in this matter were a Maulavi in Alwar and a Maulana in Delhi. 
Maulavi Mohammad Ibrahim, representing the Meos of Alwar, came to see him on 31 May 
1948 and requested that the one and a half lakh Meos of Alwar and Bharatpur, residing in 
Gurgaon, should be resettled in these states, as the lands evacuated by them had been 
redistributed among local and neighbouring Jats and not evacuees from Pakistan. In Alwar, 
Ibrahim charged, there were 11 lakh bighas, which had been only partially allotted to non-
Muslim refugees from Pakistan. He further claimed that non-Muslim evacuees from Pakistan 
were not all willing to settle on this harsh, dry land, which would go to waste in the upcoming 
cycle of monsoon. Finally, Ibrahim believed that the Matsya Union ministry and 
administration would be ‘willing to take back the Meos’, if the States Ministry told them to 
do so.78F79 In Delhi – Education Minister Abul Kalam Azad – knew better. He communicated 
directly with the Deputy Prime Minister’s powerful advisor on princely states, V. P. Menon, 
asking him to permit those Bharatpur and Alwar Meos, ‘who went to Pakistan but have now 
returned and are anxious to settle down in their old homes’, as well as ‘those Meos who took 
refuge in Gurgaon’, to do so. He too had been ‘given to understand’ that the people as well as 
the administration of both the states were amenable to their resettlement.79F80  
 
With pressure mounting thus, Neogy visited Patel in Dehradun, where the latter was 
recovering from his heart attack, to discuss the matter. Patel stuck to his previous opinion that 
all those Meos who belonged to Alwar and Bharatpur and had left for Gurgaon should be 
given facilities for rehabilitation there and that, in turn, ‘those non-Muslims entitled to 
rehabilitation facilities in Gurgaon would be given corresponding facilities in Alwar and 
20 
 
Bharatpur’. Meos who had migrated to Pakistan and have returned should be put into a camp 
and be removed to Pakistan as soon as arrangements could be made. Neogy understood from 
Patel that ‘it was a mistake to have retained any Meos in Gurgaon and a demand for the 
removal of all the Meos in Gurgaon district to Pakistan would be justified. In any case, no 
Meo should be allowed to migrate from Pakistan to India’.80F81 
 
June-August 1948: Towards a Fact-Finding Committee 
 
Faced with this united front of the MoS and R&R, Nehru took away the responsibility for the 
Meo question from Neogy’s hands and assigned it to the Minister without Portfolio, N. 
Gopalaswami Ayyangar. The latter reached out to K. B. Lall, Administrator of the Matsya 
Union, for information about the situation on ground. There the Meos, prevented from 
returning to Alwar and Bharatpur but staying just across the border in Gurgaon, were starting 
to take matters into their own hands and enter the territory of their former home-states. This 
led both Gurgaon and Matsya Union authorities to employ heavy-handed methods of army 
deployment. Lall’s informative reply to Ayyangar’s query is quite illustrative of the workings 
of the Matsya Union ministry and the MoS, in the summer of 1948. It is also remarkable for 
its casualness towards the plight of the one and a half to two lakh Meos. On its part, the 
Matsya Union had moved on, regarding ‘the entire agricultural evacuee land as reserved for 
the rehabilitation of refugees from Western Pakistan’.81F82  
Nevertheless, as alluded to above, many Meos were managing to ‘infiltrate’ into the 
vacant areas on the borders of Gurgaon. Terming their entrance into their old homes and 
lands as an ‘illegal occupation of evacuee property’, Lall estimated their number at 8,000-
10,000. Incredibly, they were being ‘persuaded to move back to Gurgaon’.82F83 There were also 
those 15,000 Meo converts who had not migrated and were holed up in the Lachhmangarh 
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tehsil of the Union. Lall was clear that if the whole of the evacuee land in Matsya was not 
required for the use of agriculturalist refugees, then the Matsya Government wished to 
dispose of a portion of it to local cultivators, with a view to easing off the pressure on the soil 
and to ‘redressing the gross inequalities’ in the prevailing system of land tenure. If, instead, 
New Delhi pressed it to resettle the Meos, ‘who had continued to hang about Gurgaon’, the 
Matsya Government would grudgingly do so, on ‘a portion of the evacuee land’.83F84  
Meos were already yesterday’s problem for the Matsya Union, whose current pursuit 
was ‘to “grow more food” and to prevent evacuee land from becoming uncultivable’.84F85 It was 
endeavouring to lease out evacuee land to locals for the Kharif season on very low rental. 
This action was, naturally, being resented by Meos, who, rightly, feared that their lands 
would thus be ‘totally lost to them’. Distressed since pre-August 1947 and disappointed post-
August 1947, they were now getting desperate and were reported to be ‘contemplating, by 
direct or indirect means, to hamper cultivation’ by the lessees. To the amoral state apparatus, 
this constituted ‘unlawful activities on the part of Meos’,85F86 an obstacle to the ‘grow more 
food’ campaign, with adverse effects on the entire programme to rehabilitate refugees. 
Matters came to a head at the eighth meeting of the Joint Rehabilitation Board held on 
25 June 1948. Nehru presided over the usual galaxy of ministers and mandarins, with the 
exception of Patel, who was represented by M. K. Kirpalani, Joint Secretary (MoS). 
Interestingly, Vinoba Bhave and Sudhir Ghose, two Gandhian social workers who were 
involved with the Meos’ struggle, were present. The resettlement of the Meos, which was 
item number three on the agenda, was taken up first. It was declared that it was ‘GOI’s 
responsibility to resettle Meos who belonging to areas in the Indian Union had left their 
homes and lands but had either not left the Union or having left it have already returned to 
it’.86F87 They were to be resettled ‘somewhere in the area comprising the Gurgaon district of 
East Punjab and the states of Alwar and Bharatpur in the Matsya Union’. Second, a ‘fact-
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finding’ committee comprising three persons consisting of a representative each of the 
Ministry of R&R, East Punjab and Matsya Union was to be appointed. It was to report by 15 
July 1948. It was to record the number of Meos present in the area, enumerate those who 
belonged to the Matsya Union, and those who had gone over to Pakistan but had returned 
and, lastly, determine the land available for allotment in East Punjab and Matsya Union. 
Pending this report, it was allowed that ‘leases for the next crop may be offered on a purely 
temporary basis to some Meos, both in Gurgaon and the Matsya Union’. Finally, it was 
accepted that the 80,000-10,000 Meos who had ‘already infiltrated into the Matsya Union 
need not be ejected’. 
These decisions clearly bore the stamp of the Prime Minister, who requested Mohan 
Lal Saksena, the new Minister for R&R, to see that the fact-finding committee keeps ‘in close 
touch with Vinoba Bhave’. Admitting that he was ‘rather afraid of purely official 
committees’ because they had ‘a tendency to view things from an office and to ignore the 
human factor of the situation’, Nehru reminded Saksena that the Meo question was one 
matter that ‘though not big in itself’, involved ‘important principles and may lead to far 
reaching consequences’. Finally, to the Prime Minister, there was ‘a definite connection 
between this business of our dealing with Meos and the Kashmir situation’.87F88 Meanwhile, 
when informed of Nehru’s decisions, Patel was ‘not in favour of giving lease of lands to 
Meos for the Kharif crop’, for its potential of ‘misunderstanding, alarm and trouble’.88F89 His 
heart was stout enough to survive both its recent seizure as well as sentiments like those 
expressed by the Meos of nine villages of Kishangarh Nizamat in Alwar in a telegram to him: 
 
We have been throughout in India. Never went to Pakistan. Moved out of 
Alwar state for 1 month due to disturbances and fear of death but lived in 
Gurgaon district villages. Returned back in our villages thence and are 
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living for the last 6 months. No land with us so far allotted for maintenance. 
We, Biswedars, have always been cultivating land. Have always been loyal 
and will be loyal in future. Beseech justice.89F90 
 
Patel’s disapproval delayed the formation of the fact-finding committee, which received its 
instructions on 30 July 1948, at the ninth meeting of the Joint Rehabilitation Board. It was 
directed to come up with ‘a definite scheme for the resettlement of displaced Meos now in 
Gurgaon district in a compact area on the borders of the Gurgaon district and the Matsya 
Union, the area being wholly in Gurgaon/Matsya or contiguous’, on the basis of a census of 
Meos. As the fact-finding committee got down to work, some of the first relevant albeit 
official and thus conservative figures started to emerge. At the outset, it appeared that the 
number of persons to be rehabilitated was 60,230 (persons who evacuated Alwar and 
Bharatpur for Gurgaon) + 1,812 (members of families partially migrated who stayed in India 
throughout and members of families partially migrated who have since returned to India) = 
62,042 persons. The land required, based upon a rough average holding per head that Meos 
generally had, was about 1.5 lakh acres. Over 4 lakh acres was reportedly available in Matsya 
Union and over a lakh in Gurgaon. The figure of 62,042 was reached by estimating Meos in 
Alwar, Bharatpur and Gurgaon (based on 1941 figures + percentage increase) before the 
exodus i.e. 4,01,596. This number had been calculated in 1947-48 as follows:90F91 
 
Meo Census, 1948 
A Remaining in India throughout as Muslims 1,82,838 
A.1 Persons who never left Alwar and Bharatpur  1,22,608 
A.2 Persons who left Alwar and Bharatpur for Gurgaon 60,230 
B Members of families partially migrated, who stayed in India  4,294 
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C Members of families partially migrated, who returned to India 9,556 
D Remained in India as converts 11,823 
E Total number who remained in India (A+B+C+D) 2,08,511 
F Migrated to Pakistan and not returned  1,93,085 
 Total Number of Meos (E+F) 4,01,596 
 
This exercise in cold calculation was in stark contrast to the heated episodes on the ground, 
now increasing in frequency, with the army stationed at Bharatpur getting involved. The 
commandant there sent an intelligence report that compiled well ‘the competing and 
conflicting aims of local agriculturalists, local Baniyas, refugees, Pattedars and Meos’ that 
had produced ‘a problem of considerable complexity’. The conclusion was unmistakable: ‘in 
the absence of a definite clarification of the Government policy regarding the Meos question, 
it is impossible to check the entry of the Meos, who are being invited by vested interests, 
which is becoming a cause of corruption’.91F92  
Non-co-operative and unprincipled tehsildars, demanding revenue officials and police 
constables, opposing view-points within the central government, an uncertain DM, a high-
handed army, local lalas and corrupt patwaris coordinating, collecting sums and promising 
resettlement to the Meos from Gurgaon – all had contributed in a surreptitious settlement of 
Meos in certain border villages. This matrix was causing considerable trouble for the Matsya 
Union ministers and administrators. Besides, there were the social workers and organisations, 
who might appear as a problem to various parts of the state apparatus, but to the Prime 
Minister, they were his prime informants. His main point remained that the 60,000 Meos, 
belonging to Alwar and Bharatpur, in Gurgaon ‘should go back’ even though only 1,34,000 
acres of ‘rather inferior land’ was left over, from their old possession of 4,00,000 acres. Out 
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of this, 1,16,000 acres had been ‘temporarily leased’ to the refugees and another 1,50,000 
acres had been similarly given ‘to local people…to avoid the land lying uncultivated’.92F93  
In early-August 1948, Nehru received a letter from the journalist B. Shiva Rao. It 
drew upon the eye-witness account of another, Dr Sivakamu of Women’s Hospital, Alwar to 
report that while the government was thinking of sending Meos back to Alwar, those who 
were actually there were being ‘driven out’.93F94 Several groups of Meos walking on the Alwar-
Gurgaon-Delhi highway had told Dr Sivakamu that they were being driven out of their homes 
to Pakistan: ‘the police and the soldiers tell us, your home is in Pakistan and these lands are 
for the Hindus. If you do not go away, we shall drive you with our sticks’. Ironically, they 
had returned to India, from Pakistan, relying on Nehru’s and Gandhi’s assurances that they 
could do so safely. Shiva Rao could not resist the jibe that large tracts of land were lying 
fallow because the Punjabis did not know ‘how to cultivate these lands without water’,94F95 as 
against the Meos, who knew Mewati soil but had been repeatedly removed from it.  
While these turf-wars continued, Vallabhbhai Patel sent a long note to Nehru on the 
above-mentioned decisions. Beginning with the questionable claim that ‘the Meos [did] not 
belong to the category of those who had left their homes temporarily for another place in 
India’, Patel further stated that ‘they had left their homes for good and were fully resolved to 
leave for Pakistan’. He asserted was that ‘the main difficulty’ in regard to return of Meos to 
Alwar and Bharatpur was ‘the law and order problem’. He felt that ‘the return of Meos, even 
in comparatively small numbers, would upset the whole non-Muslim population of Alwar 
and Bharatpur’ as Meos had never been a ‘peaceful section of the population’. They had the 
‘upper hand’ in inter-communal feuds and ‘even in the last disturbances’, they took the law 
into their own hands ‘with a view to aligning themselves with the Muslim League and 
establishing for themselves a Meoistan’. Patel therefore insisted that it was ‘unwise and 
inappropriate’ to accentuate the law and order problem by sending these Meos to ‘hostile 
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surroundings’. He claimed that the rulers of Alwar and Bharatpur had done their best to 
protect the Meos, and on this basis assumed that ‘if these Meos left, they did so because their 
loyalties were elsewhere and because they did not wish to face the revenge and anger of the 
population, whom they had wronged’.95F96 As The Statesman had commented on 5 October 
1947, ‘how were the Muslims of India to prove their loyalty when the very act of fleeing in 
fear from their homes was interpreted as a sign of disloyalty and extra-territorial 
attachment?’96F97 Patel’s conclusion was that 
 
…grievance and bitterness of that wrong [persisted] in the areas ravaged by 
Meos and in view of the population being either local or refugee or mixed, 
the return of Meos to their old homes would be fraught with serious risk. 
Nor would it be in our interests to force Meos back into their homes at the 
points of bayonet…97F98 
 
September-December 1948: Carving out a ‘Compact Area’ 
 
Nehru and the cabinet decided on 1 September 1948 to wait for the report of the fact-finding 
committee and an accompanying scheme for the resettlement of the displaced Meos in a 
compact area on the borders of Gurgaon district and the Matsya Union. Meanwhile, the 
process of settling the Meos in Gurgaon district and the adjoining areas of the Matsya Union 
was to proceed and it was presumed that the States Ministry was taking action to implement it 
as far as the Matsya Union was concerned.98F99 On 15 September 1948, the committee 
consisting of N.C. Shrivastava, K.B. Lall and Tarlok Singh reported the following figures on 
the basis of the above-mentioned census of Meos taken in July 1948:  
Report of the Fact-finding Committee, 1948 
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Meo families in Alwar, Bharatpur and Gurgaon 19,525 
Alwar 
Number of Meo families  6,846 
Officially verified landholdings  1,758 
Area officially claimed 26,754 acres 
Bharatpur 
Number of Meo families  5,940 
Officially verified landholdings  2,126 
Area officially claimed  27,807 acres 
Area in Alwar and Bharatpur required on behalf of 
the displaced Meos  
95,082 acres (41,804 acres in Alwar, 
53,278 acres in Bharatpur) 
Area in Alwar and Bharatpur already allotted to 
refugees  
39,932 acres (26,643 acres on lease, 
of which 19,000 acres had been held 
earlier by Meos) 
Gurgaon 
Number of Meo families 6,739 
Area abandoned by Meos 37,321 acres in Nuh tehsil and 43,849 
acres in Ferozepur Jhirka 
Area needed for restoration to Meos 5,490 acres in Nuh and 8,371 acres in 
Ferozepur Jhirka 
Area available 24,987 acres 
 
While outlining its scheme, the committee emphasised the need for an early 
settlement, in time for sowing Rabi crops. It was conscious that, as temporary allotments to 
refugees had already been made till the end of Rabi 1948-49, the two schemes – refugee 
rehabilitation and Meo restoration – had got intertwined. Thus, permanently resettling Meos 
in Alwar and Bharatpur meant relocating refugees and it appeared that sufficient area was 
simply no longer available. On the other hand, a temporary settlement of Meos was possible 
for Rabi 1948-49 in Nuh and Ferozepur Jhirka regions of Gurgaon in the free land (24,987 
acres) and that portion of leased land (21,000 acres) already held by the Meos, who had been 
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residing there since the disturbances. Moreover, 13,315 acres were available in the Tijara and 
Pahari tehsils of Alwar and Bharatpur, which were contiguous to Nuh and Ferozepur Jhirka. 
Taken together, these lands amounted to 59,302 acres, a ‘compact area’ on which the 
displaced Meos could be settled. In effect, this meant that four-fifths of the displaced Meos 
were to be settled in the villages of their dislocation and were not to be sent back to their 
original homes. The committee claimed that the Nuh and Ferozepur land was better in quality 
than their original holdings in the dry lands of Alwar and Bharatpur. For the remaining one-
fifth, twenty villages in Tijara (Alwar) and twelve villages in Pahari (Bharatpur) were to be 
provided.99F100 The Joint Rehabilitation Board met on 24 September to consider these proposals 
and decided that the  
 
displaced Meos from the Matsya Union and Gurgaon district who remained 
in the Indian Union or who, having left it, returned and been included in the 
census, be given temporary allotment up to the end of Rabi 1948-49, 45,987 
acres of cultivated land in the Nuh and Ferozepur Jhirka tehsils of Gurgaon 
district and 13,315 acres of cultivated land in the Tijara and Pahari tehsils of 
the Matsya Union, immediately adjoining Nuh and Ferozepur Jhirka.  
 
Further, ‘in view of the inadequacy of information regarding the quality of land in the 
Matsya Union and the insufficiency of the area immediately available’, each landholder was 
to get three-fourths of his verified holding in Matsya i.e. one acre of well-irrigated land was 
to be taken as equivalent to one and a half acres of unirrigated land. This ad hoc evaluation 
was, however, not intended to prejudice the final assessment of land in Matsya Union and the 
permanent allotment of land outside Matsya Union. Finally, the fact-finding committee was 
directed to prepare a scheme for permanent settlement for displaced Meos to take effect from 
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Kharif 1949. However, even this permanent allotment was not to happen in Alwar and 
Bharatpur, from where an area of 50,000 acres of cultivated land was to be made available for 
immediate temporary allotment to refugees from East Punjab. This area was ‘on account for 
East Punjab refugees’, but the question of how much land was to be made available in the 
Matsya Union for allotment to refugees selected by the East Punjab government was to be 
considered at the time of permanent settlement of Meos in Gurgaon i.e. East Punjab.100F101 
With the policy decision seemingly made, the officials were keen to implement and 
entrench it. K. B. Lall, at the Matsya Union, was first in instructing his officers to lease out 
13,350 acres of cultivable land in Tijara and Pahari tehsils for a year. The irony, as Lall 
himself noted, was that there were ‘no refugees from East Punjab requiring rehabilitation 
facilities in Matsya Union’, and the latter had merely been asked ‘to reserve 50,000 acres of 
land for refugees from West Punjab in lieu of the area to be allotted to our Meos in the 
Gurgaon district’. Matsya’s Meos largely remained in Gurgaon, West Punjab’s refugees 
largely remained in East Punjab, and the former’s land was reserved for the latter’s future 
use.101F102 Some, like Patel’s influential secretary, V. Shankar continued to remain restive, 
having noticed that the Rehabilitation Board had included ‘Meos who had returned from 
Pakistan’ in the plans. Shankar challenged this, as the previous position had referred only to 
Meos who had left Alwar and Bharatpur, but not those who had ‘left for Pakistan’.102F103 
Shankar wanted the MoS to look into this and drew the attention of the Ministry of R&R. The 
East Punjab government was complaining that the Matsya Union had not transferred the 
stipulated 50,000 acres of land for allotment to Punjabi refugees, while the East Punjab 
government had allotted land to the Meos of Matsya Union. According to the terms of 
evacuee property arrangement in the two Punjabs, the area allotted to Punjabi refugees, who 
owned land in Pakistan, was to be carved from these 50,000 acres.103F104  
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A surprised Lall replied that by end-October it was ‘too late for refugees to prepare 
for Rabi sowings’, and that East Punjab had not made any requests either. He claimed it was 
‘too late to talk in terms of temporary allotment’ but promised to set apart ‘an equivalent area 
of land in Matsya Union for the rehabilitation of refugees of Punjabi extraction, who would 
otherwise have been settled in Gurgaon district, in the final resettlement scheme.104F105 
Unconvinced, the East Punjab government continued to press.105F106 Lall however asserted that 
since approximately 27,000 acres of land had already been allotted to Punjabi refugees in 
Alwar district and an equal area in Bharatpur district, the claim of the East Punjab 
government had already been met.106F107 This ‘staggered programme’, as Ian Copland called 
it,107F108 of reluctant rehabilitation can scarcely be called either an assertion of Prime Ministerial 
authority or an acknowledgement of Gandhi’s wish for the Meos. Smothered by a stalling 
bureaucracy and supported by non-officials like Sunder Lal, Bhave, Sarabhai and Ghosh, 
Nehru had reached out within the Congress Working Committee to President Rajendra 
Prasad. Patel’s response to Prasad on that occasion indicates well the intensity and personal 
impress with which the Deputy Prime Minister was determined to hold his hard-line 
approach. In the face of such intransigence, as follows, the Prime Minister had little 
alternative but to accept whatever assurance Patel was agreeing to: 
 
I am not aware of any promise which Gandhiji made. I am sure he could not 
have given any promise about resettlement of Meos in the States. I had long 
talks with him on this question and our policy then was not to interfere with 
internal administration of the States. It was only after his murder that we 
dared to interfere in these States…I have no hesitation in saying that any 
other policy might well result in a disaster similar to the one which cost us 
Gandhiji’s precious life. I see no reason why there should be any hurry 
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about this matter and I do not appreciate the reason why this matter should 
come before the Working Committee…I would advise postponement of 
consideration of this question…If however postponement is not considered 
possible and any decision to reverse the existing policy is taken, I am afraid 
I will have no alternative but to resign from the Working Committee.108F109 
  
November 1948-March 1949: ‘Further Shores’ of Meo’s Displacement 
 
Around this time, away from this bureaucratic wrangling and political battle of wills, 
occurred an episode that shows how far were the Meos displaced. From the recently annexed 
princely state of Hyderabad, J. N. Chaudhuri, the military administrator, wrote to M. K. 
Vellodi in the MoS that approximately 6,500 Meo refugees of Bharatpur and Alwar states, 
who had taken shelter in the Hyderabad state in the disturbances of 1947, were expressing 
‘reluctance’ to go back to their homes. This was in contrast to Muslim refugees from other 
areas such as the Central Provinces and Berar, the Madras province and the princely states of 
Gwalior and Mysore. They were insisting on being ‘allowed and enabled to go to Pakistan’ 
or, failing that, ‘desired a safe passage to Bombay from where they said they would spread 
out in the Indian Territory’. Chaudhuri did not want them to move to Pakistan, for – apart 
from logistical difficulties – he feared negative publicity about the plight of Muslims in 
Hyderabad and the Indian Union.109F110  
At the MoS, the junior Ganesan felt that it should not be difficult for the Matsya 
Union to take back these 6,500 Meos by allotting some additional land.110F111 V. Shankar, 
however, refused to consider this, citing refugee dislocation, law and order, ‘enough 
claimants for land’ and the Meos’ unwillingness to return. He supported sending these people 
to Pakistan and ‘in the meantime to keep them where they are’.111F112 On 19 November 1948, in 
32 
 
an audacious move, a deputation of Meos waited on Patel in Jaipur, who asked them to 
submit their grievances in writing. Mohammad Mian, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Hind, did so and it makes for difficult reading: 
 
We know that Sardar Sahib is a man of determination and does what he 
says. The Meos have been suffering now for more than one and a half years. 
They are loyal citizens of Indian Union and had repeatedly claimed their 
loyalty to their mother country in the presence of Mahatma Ji. Their non-
Muslim neighbours are prepared to welcome them back. They should be 
rehabilitated in [the] unpopulated villages of Alwar and Bharatpur. 
Prajamandal and local Hindus are prepared to help this. Though the GOI 
[has given] all assurance and satisfaction to the Meos but the behaviour of 
the police officers is such that Meos feel much disgusted. They are being 
beaten very badly and are being asked to go to Pakistan and, at the sweet-
will of police officers, searches are made. Even Congress and Jamiat 
workers are the victims of police anger. Madrasas are being forced to close. 
Juma Masjid, Gurgaon, is in possession of the refugees. This mosque at least 
may be vacated, and its possession restored to Muslims.112F113  
 
Patel was, however, saying something entirely different to his officials. He had first 
asked the Ministry of R&R to approach Pakistan to accept the Hyderabadi Meos. It demurred, 
reminding Patel that Pakistan had only agreed to exchange the populations of East and West 
Punjab and had already protested against Muslims from Delhi, Alwar and Bharatpur being 
sent to it.113F114 Patel then turned to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to approach 
Pakistan to accept ‘the transfer of Meos from Hyderabad’.114F115 As the MEA was headed by 
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Nehru himself, one wonders how Patel expected that ministry to oblige him. The Pakistan 
Government was not willing to allow them to enter that Dominion because they were ‘Indian 
Musalmans’ and the disillusioned Jamiat now approached the Governor-General C. 
Rajagopalachari, who forwarded this plea to B. G. Kher, premier Bombay, where the 
Hyderabad Meos had reached by that time. Kher approached Patel, who, again, assured 
repatriation but made no commitments about its location. Kher conveyed this open-ended 
assurance to Mohammad Mian on 17 December 1948. In the last days of 1948, these 6,500 
Meos seemed en route to Pakistan. The Police Commissioner of Bombay confirmed that they 
did not intend going back to their native places, ‘for fear of molestation’.115F116 Patel, Shankar 
and the MoS clung to the Meos’ unwillingness to return, the Matsya Union’s unwillingness to 
accept them and their insistence that when ‘in almost all other matters, Pakistan [had] been 
making Alwar and Bharatpur at par with East Punjab’ then why not so ‘for the purpose of 
permitting these Meos’ to go there.116F117 They instructed the Bombay government that they 
were taking up the question with GOP and meanwhile the Meos were not to be sent to Alwar 
and Bharatpur.117F118  
Eventually, on 21 January 1949, Subimal Dutt, the Commonwealth Secretary, 
attempted to confront Patel and reminded the MoS that there was a letter from Kher stating 
that ‘Sardar Patel had promised to render every assistance for the rehabilitation of these 
refugees in their own homeland’. Moreover, Dutt insisted that there was ‘no question of our 
making a reference to Pakistan at this stage’ and claimed that Pakistan will refuse to receive 
so many Muslim refugees from India.118F119 The episode dragged on, with the Ministry of R&R 
now siding with the MEA. Secretary C. N. Chandra noted that from Dutt’s letter it was clear 
that Patel gave Kher to understand that every facility would be afforded to the 6,500 Meos in 
Bombay to return to Alwar and Bharatpur. Chandra also had a technical (and moral) point: 
‘since these Meos did not leave the Indian Dominion, I do not know whether we can refuse to 
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rehabilitate them in their own homes’.119F120 The Deputy Prime Minister found a way out of this 
dilemma. While he dropped the question of approaching the Pakistan Government, he desired 
instead to give all facilities to those who wished to proceed to Pakistan ‘to approach the 
Pakistan High-Commission/Permit Officer’ and obtain a permit.120F121 The Chief Secretary, 
Bombay, was accordingly instructed.121F122  
Meanwhile, while the Matsya Union was fulfilling the commitment of rehabilitating 
the Meos in the thirty-three ear-marked villages, in addition to allotting 77,000 acres of land 
to Punjabi refugees, the East Punjab administration was slacking in allotting land to the 
displaced Meos. Consequently, a number of Meos were moving in the countryside of 
Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur. With social workers like Vinoba Bhave, religious leaders like 
Maulavi Ibrahim, and, interested ministers like Bhola Ram touring, assuring and encouraging 
Meos ‘to resettle in their deserted houses’, the East Punjab Government’s lack of action was 
tantamount to flouting New Delhi’s ‘compact area’ decision. An irked K.B. Lall was now 
suggesting ‘substantially adding to the area reserved in the Matsya Union’ for Meos. In the 
present situation, he did not see any possibility of refugees and Meos sharing the same village 
peacefully. Lall felt that ‘if each and every’ displaced Meo was allowed to return to his home, 
a large number of those who had gone to Pakistan would ‘trek back to their lands’.122F123 Instead 
Lall proposed another list of villages amounting to 21,013 acres in Alwar and 21,166 acres in 
Bharatpur for Meos’ resettlement, while warning the MoS about the ‘rapid infiltration’ of 
Meos. Lall’s complaint was forwarded to the East Punjab government and Patel himself sent 
a letter to Premier Bhimsen Sachar on 23 April 1949. He also approved Lall’s proposal of the 
extra land for Meos with the proviso that ‘care should be taken to ensure that the Meos settled 
in these villages are in no circumstances allowed to overflow into other areas’ thereby giving 
rise to undesirable complications.123F124 
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Coda 
 
By April 1949, the situation on the ground was overtaking the permission on paper and some 
27,000 Meos had made their way into Bharatpur, as Lall put it, ‘without permits’ and with the 
assistance of ‘corrupt local police and Mahajans’.124F125 Almost exactly two years after they 
were forcibly removed from their homes, Meos were forcing their way back to their original 
holdings despite the resistance of the MoS and the Matsya Union administration.125F126 Much 
like their departure in March-April 1947, their arrival in March-April 1949 too was achieved 
in an ‘unsatisfactory atmosphere’. In both years, the administrative arrangements were 
‘inadequate to hold the scales between the Meos, the Punjabi refugees and the Jats’.126F127 And, 
like the many Gandhians who supported them in 1947, there was another Gandhian on the 
scene in 1949, Sudhir Ghosh. Appointed as a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner by Nehru, 
he was pushing for the ‘wholesale restoration’ of Meo holdings in Matsya Union.127F128  
In the last meeting of the fact-finding committee, it was finally decided to 
acknowledge ground realities and trifurcate the solution to the Meos’ problem. Land was to 
be ‘reserved’ for refugees, ‘restored’ to Meos and maintained ‘vacant’ for future settlement of 
either displaced Muslims or non-Muslim refugees. Original holdings were to be matched with 
their equivalent, rehabilitation was to be met with resettlement and, together, both were to 
contribute to the ‘grow more food’ campaign. As far as possible, these categories were to be 
made complementary and not conflictual. In case of a clash, ‘compact’ areas were to be 
created, with Meos to be settled in the interior tracts, with its brackish water, deep wells and 
light soil, while the refugees were to be settled on agricultural property. Of course, ‘mixed 
communities’ were not yet to be countenanced.128F129 
Two years from the summer of 1947, the process of the return of Meos to their 
homelands had begun. The Matsya Union had verified the claims of 6,329 Meos (3,016 from 
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Alwar and 3,315 from Bharatpur), amounting to 70,220 acres (34,400 in Alwar and 35,820 in 
Bharatpur). In the villages ear-marked for them, 9,449 acres in Alwar and 4,567 acres in 
Bharatpur had been allotted, making it a total of 14,016 acres in the Matsya Union. In 
Gurgaon, Meos belonging to the district had been allotted 19,904 acres, of which possession 
had been taken to the extent of 19,039 acres. A total allotment of 11,635 acres had been made 
to the Meos of Matsya Union in Gurgaon district, of which physical possession had been 
taken to the extent of 5,193 acres. In Ferozepur Jhirka, possession of 4,808 acres had been 
taken out of 5,748 acres allotted. It was only in the Nuh tehsil, where the allotted area was 
5,887 acres that barely any physical possession had been taken: 385 acres only.  
As they were able to get back to their homelands or its adjoining areas, Meos of the 
Matsya Union were not inclined to go to Nuh, which was non-contiguous to Matsya. Gopilal 
Yadav, minister for R&R in the Matsya Union in 1949, now sought to convince the ‘official 
mind’ in New Delhi that the resettlement of Meos and other Muslim landowners ‘in their own 
villages’ did not present any law and order problem. That concern was complicated by 
another: namely that evacuee lands had remained only partially utilised. Consequently, the 
population that turned against them two years previously, seemed willing to ‘welcome’ them. 
By their own actions, Meos had made restoration in their villages ‘the more obvious course’ 
because of the considerable number who had already gone there. To echo Mayaram, they 
were yet again resisting a regime. Moreover, in the neighbouring Gurgaon, under the order of 
the East Punjab government, ‘all Muslims who had remained in the Indian Union were being 
given their own lands with effect from Kharif 1949’ and the fact-finding committee thus 
recommended that, simultaneously, there would be a ‘restoration of Meos and Muslim 
landowners recorded in the census of July 1948, even if they were returnees from Pakistan, 
and including Meos of Matsya Union, who had received temporary allotment in Gurgaon 
during Rabi 1948-49’.129F130  
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Conclusion 
 
Just when all clouds on the official horizon seemed to be clearing, it was decided that the 
Matsya Union was to be integrated with the United State of Rajasthan on 15 May 1949.130F131 
Any recommendation regarding the resettlement of the Meos had to henceforth go to Jaipur. 
The unaware Meos had to brace for a battle during 1949-50 with yet another layer of the 
state. Their return was not smoothened, only splintered. They had survived the old Alwar and 
Bharatpur princely states and ‘the killing fields’ of Partition but paying ‘the price of survival’ 
to the post-1947 bureaucracies had arguably bruised them much more.131F132 The Meos had 
returned but as Gyanendra Pandey put the question perspicaciously: could ‘a Muslim really 
be an Indian’ at the altar of normative Hindu belonging, deserving of life and redistribution of 
resources? 132F133 The bureaucratic mind could certainly not fathom the liminality of the Meos’ 
and it could therefore not factor their re-territorialisation. Pandey’s observations are to the 
point: there was not just ‘a bureaucratic imperative at work…but a nationalist imperative as 
well’.133F134 The Prime Minister himself put it well:  
 
Our whole organisation has been built up with a view to helping the vast 
+mass of Hindu and Sikh refugees…It is not conditioned to look after 
Muslims whose cases stand on a somewhat different footing…there is not 
too much sympathy for these Muslim families among government 
departments or outside…134F135  
 
It would take some more administrative organisation and sanitisation of ‘state 
violence’,135F136 before the Meos would be re-placed and no longer dis-placed. This would mean 
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more of the tensions recorded in this article, namely of conflicting perspectives within the 
government establishment, with the Prime Minister stymied by his stalling Deputy, the 
limited influence of empathetic Gandhian activists over their ‘official’ interlocutors, and the 
then-prevailing competitive, communalised environment. The post-partition Indian nation-
state tried to contain this environment by determining a separate if unequal certainty, 
wherever it found itself ranged against a pre-partition society; whether in Hyderabad or 
Mewat. The question of ‘Muslim belonging in secular India’ emerged, as shown by Taylor 
Sherman in the case of Hyderabad, not only amidst communal violence or refugee 
rehabilitation but an assertion of ‘majority rule’, first through ‘government service’ and, later, 
electoral democracy.136F137 In Mewat, to Nehru, ‘what was done to the Meos’ did not seem to be 
‘any concession at all’. The Prime Minister lamented that there was ‘a great deal of loose talk 
about a secular state. What that means, few people seem to understand’.137F138 As he put it, 
Muslims in India had ‘no particular rights except what we, out of our grace, might grant 
them’.138F139 He understood the need to ‘be strict about the return of large number of Muslims to 
India from Pakistan’, appreciated that psychologically refugees were ‘irritated by even a 
single instance…after the violence of the post-partition days’, and admitted that it was 
‘difficult to apply any strict legal test’ but, ‘viewed with dismay and sorrow the narrow and 
communal outlook’ that accompanied these sentiments, and which had progressively grown 
and showed itself in Mewat.139F140  
This article partakes in the ongoing shifts in the study of late-1940s in India and 
exposes the cracks between the two periods of partition and democracy. It has sought to 
juxtapose the ‘high politics’ and elite bureaucratic understandings that permeated the state on 
the one hand, and contrasted it with the expectations of the Meos, their idealist sympathisers 
and their response to the experience of violence. From the prelude to Partition to its long 
aftermath, the old liminal socio-cultural existence of the Meos was compromised by the 
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taxonomies of the political institutions of the new Indian nation-state. The nation’s search for 
stability, security and consolidation was catastrophic for the Meos. While the process of state 
re-formation and subject re-creation was on its way, simultaneously and as a consequence, 
another passage of ruination and parochialisation of critical segments of society was also set 
in motion; indeed, the former fed the latter. Partition’s afterlife in Mewat rendered inter-
community relations perilous and they also severely compromised discourse between state 
and society. This denouement redefined the Meos’ new status and habitus, reduced their 
socio-political existence and removed their broader cultural resonances. It might be 
historiographically reductive to speak of the long shadow of collective memories of these 
events in the region today as a reason for the continuing violence against Meos in recent 
times.140F141 But it would not be reductive to draw comparisons in the script of the post-partition 
Indian nation-state as it dealt with the complex social constitution of its citizens during a 
period of crisis and the taxonomies by which the ‘secular state’ labels ‘minorities; and 
continues to question and parse their rights of belonging and identification in India.  
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